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**Rising from the Rubble:
Emergence of Place-Based Social Capital in Gölcük, Turkey***

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Although there is emerging literature on social capital and disasters, little is known about the impact of disasters on social capital formation. This paper aims to fill this gap in the literature through a case study of the city of Gölcük in the aftermath of the August 17, 1999 earthquake, which resulted in an official death toll of 17,480 in Turkey. The case study suggests that disasters can redefine disaster victims' attachment to the place (i.e., their city, neighborhood) and to their fellow residents (i.e., solidarity with other earthquake victims). Local leaders can play an important role in transforming these cognitive elements into structural components of social capital in the form of place-based networks during the disaster recovery process. In Gölcük, local leaders built on their pre-disaster civic and political experience to help disaster victims mobilize toward collective action after the earthquake. They also helped disaster victims find international and domestic donors to support the activities of their networks. Local leaders' efforts to form the networks came forth despite the lack of enabling state institutions and policies, especially at the central government level. The paper concludes with lessons for policy makers on how they could contribute to place-based social capital formation in disaster stricken communities.

Key words: Disaster, recovery, social capital, emergent groups, Turkey

Introduction

Disaster researchers have long established that disaster victims temporarily become more cohesive to better cope with the challenges of a disaster situation, especially during the search and rescue period. Fritz and his colleagues documented such cohesive post-disaster behavior as early as the 1950s (e.g., Fritz and Marks 1954; Fritz and Mathewson 1957). Some labeled this phenomena as the “therapeutic,” “synthetic” “altruistic” or “the

utopian” community (Barton 1969; Fritz 1961; Taylor, Zurcher and Key 1970; Thompson and Hawkes 1962). Others called it “emergence” or “emergent behavior” (Bardo 1978; Parr 1970).

An important line of research on post-disaster cohesive behavior has been on *emergent* groups. These groups form after disaster events and are composed of “private citizens who work together in pursuit of collective goals relevant to actual or potential disasters” (Stallings and Quarantelli 1985, p. 94). They are distinctive from the groups that exist prior-to disasters but carry out post-disaster tasks. According to the Disaster Research Center (DRC) typology of organized behavior (Dynes and Quarantelli 1968; Quarantelli 1995; 1992), the extant prior-to disaster groups could be *established* groups (those that carry out their pre-disaster tasks after disasters with no change in their structures), *expanding* groups (those that get involved in post-disaster activities with changes in their organizational structure) or *extending* groups (those that get involved in post-disaster activities without changes in their organizational structure).

In *Human System Responses to Disaster*, Drabek (1986) noted that a theory of emergent groups was yet to take hold in the disaster literature. Tierney, Lindell and Perry (2001, p. 119) echoed a similar sentiment: “we still understand little about why emergent groups form, what facilitates emergence, how emergent structures develop, and why some emergent groups persist while others disappear.” Most studies on emergent groups in the literature have so far focused on the emergency response and rescue period of disasters, noting that these groups are initially composed of disaster victims and often undertake critical tasks during this period, such as saving lives, providing food, and cleaning the debris (Aguirre et al. 1995; Dynes, Quarantelli and Wenger 1990; Noji 1989; Rodriguez, Trainor and Quarantelli 2006; Tierney 1994; Voorhees 2008; Wenger 1991). While these findings are important, our knowledge on emergent groups during preparedness, mitigation, and recovery phases of disasters remains limited (Drabek and McEntire 2003, p.101, 108).

In this paper, I focus on emergent groups during disaster recovery period through the lens of social capital. Following Putnam (1995), I view social capital as civic networks as well as norms and social trust that facilitate collective action. Whereas earlier researchers who studied post-disaster cohesion and emergent groups do not use the term “social capital” per se, their studies certainly indicate that informal groups and norms facilitating collective action emerge following disasters, at least during the search and rescue period.

There is a small yet growing literature on social capital and disasters, mostly focusing on the role of pre-existing social capital (both in positive and negative terms) in the mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery phases of disasters. Based on their study of the 1997 Red River Flood in Manitoba (Canada), Buckland and Rahman (1999) argue that, whereas communities with higher levels of social capital were better prepared for and responded more effectively to floods, they faced more resistance to timely evacuation

due to social capital. Ganapati (2005), Jalali (2002) and Özerdem and Jacoby (2006) suggest that social capital filled in the vacuum left by the state authorities during the disaster response period following the August 17, 1999 earthquake in Turkey. Dynes (2002) emphasizes the importance of pre-existing social capital for evacuation decisions (preparedness phase) and for saving lives (response phase). Wisner (2003) suggests that social capital could be utilized to reduce risk and vulnerability in mega-cities (e.g., Mexico City, Los Angeles, Manila, and Tokyo) for mitigation purposes. Brouwer and Nhassengo (2006) highlight the importance of social capital for recovery of poorer households after the 2000 floods in the Mabalane District, Mozambique. In their studies of 1995 and 2001 earthquakes in Kobe (Japan) and Gujarat (India), respectively, Nakagawa and Shaw (2004) suggest that communities with social capital and leadership can make a successful and speedy recovery in the aftermath of disasters. In a more critical examination, Aldrich and Crook (2008) suggest that social capital (measured by the percentage of eligible residents voting) plays a dual role in post-disaster recovery. On one hand, it brings together disaster victims for collective action. On the other hand, such collective action may stop projects that are controversial but perhaps necessary for a speedy recovery, such as allowing for trailer parks to temporarily accommodate disaster victims.

Although these studies on social capital make significant contributions to the disaster literature, they do not examine the factors that lead to formation of social capital following a disaster. In this context, I ask the following questions that have received little attention in the literature: Can disasters lead to social capital formation [I use this term interchangeably with “emergence” throughout the rest of this article]? If yes, what factors lead to such formation? Specifically, I focus on the collaborative norms that emerge after disasters; the role of local leaders; and the role of the state institutions and policies in facilitating (or inhibiting) social capital formation.

I explore the above questions through a qualitative case study of the city of Gölcük in the aftermath of the August 17, 1999 earthquake that claimed more than 17,000 lives in Turkey. Following the earthquake, three *place-based* civic networks formed in Gölcük, addressing the collective needs of territorial communities and allowing the residents of these communities to unite around issues that matter to their neighborhoods and/or the city. The case study suggests that disasters can redefine disaster victims’ attachment to the place (i.e., their city, neighborhood) and to their fellow residents (i.e., solidarity), and that local leaders can play an important role in transforming these cognitive elements into place-based networks (structural components of social capital) during the disaster recovery process. Local leaders in Gölcük built on their pre-disaster civic and political experience to help disaster victims mobilize for collective action after the earthquake. They also helped disaster victims find international and domestic donors to support the activities of their networks. Local leaders’ efforts to form the networks came forth despite

the lack of enabling state institutions and policies, especially at the central government level.

The findings of the case study offer lessons for policy makers who are interested in building social capital in disaster stricken communities during the recovery period. The recovery period presents policy makers with opportunities to proactively implement mitigation strategies (such as comprehensive plans, zoning, and building codes) to avoid future community disaster vulnerabilities (Cuny 1979; Rubin, Saperstein and Barbee 1985; Schwab 1998a; 1998b). It also allows them to build more resilient (Murphy 2007; Vale and Campanella 2005), equitable (Oliver-Smith 1991) and sustainable (Berke and Beatley 1997; Possekkel 1999) communities. To build such communities, however, policy makers need to involve disaster victims and their networks, especially those that focus on the place, in decision making processes (Ganapati and Ganapati 2009). This paper aims to help policy makers develop a greater understanding of why these networks form and what their needs and capacities are.

In the sections that follow, I first provide a review of the social capital literature, followed by a description of my research methods. Then, I introduce the three place-based networks that formed in Gölcük after the August 17, 1999 earthquake. Next, I examine the factors that led to the formation of these networks, including the cognitive components of social capital (e.g., redefined bonding to place and solidarity), local leaders and the state. Finally, I conclude with a summary and discussion of directions for future research as well as lessons for policy makers on how to use disasters as windows of opportunities, given that they have had a disaster, to contribute to social capital formation in disaster stricken communities.

How Does Social Capital Form?

The term social capital was initially introduced to the scholarly world through the writings of sociologists Pierre Bourdieu (1986) and James Coleman (1993; 1990; 1988) [see Portes (1998) for earlier origins of the concept]. However, it was the political scientist Robert Putnam (2002; 2000; 1995) who popularized the concept across the disciplines. As Woolcock and Narayan (2000, p. 225) suggest, the discourse on social capital has helped “bridge orthodox divides among scholars, practitioners, and policymakers.” Although the concept is not without its critiques (e.g., Arrow 2000; DeFillipis 2001; Edwards and Foley 1998; Fine 2001; Harriss 2002; Mohan and Mohan 2002; Portes 2000; 1998; Portes and Landolt 1996; Putzel 1997; Rubio 1997; Solow 2000), there are now many studies across the disciplines suggesting that benefits of social capital flow from individuals and households to communities, regions, and even nations. Some of the benefits mentioned in the literature include economic growth (Helliwell and Putnam 2000; Knack and Keefer 1997), pluralist democracy (Fukuyama 2001; Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti 1993), health and well-being (Berkman and Glass 2000; Cohen et

al. 1997; Yip et al. 2007), household welfare (Narayan 1997; Narayan and Pritchett 1997), management of common resources (Khrisna and Uphoff 2002; Ostrom 2000), prevention of conflict and community peace (Khrisna 2002; Varshney 2002), public safety (Ferguson and Mindel 2007; Saegert, Winkel and Swartz 2002), neighborhood/community development (Grant 2001; Portes and Mooney 2002), poverty alleviation (Moser 1996; Narayan 1999), delivery of basic services (Isham and Kahkonen 2002; Pargal, Gilligan and Huq 2002), and sustainability of development projects (Nel, Binns and Motteux 2001).

Social capital is complementary to other types of human-made capital: *physical capital* (e.g., productive equipment that enable production such as machines and tools) and *human capital* (e.g., stock of skills and knowledge that enable production) [see Berkes and Folke (1994), Bourdieu (1986), Coleman (1988), and Ostrom (2000) for types of capital]. There is no commonly agreed upon definition of the concept, however. Some studies consider social capital to be a mainly private resource that could be utilized by individuals (or families) embedded within social networks to enhance their personal benefits, such as finding a job [e.g., Bourdieu (1986), Burt (1997), Coleman (1988), Lin (2001), and Robison, Schmid and Siles (2002)]. Other studies suggest that social capital is a collective resource that could be utilized to further mutual benefits, such as providing affordable housing in a given community [e.g., Coleman (1990), Fukuyama (1995), Khrishna (2002), and Putnam (1995)].

In this paper, I draw upon the collective-oriented rather than the individual-oriented theories of social capital. Following Putnam (1995, p. 67), I define social capital as “features of social organization such as networks, norms and social trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit.” The basic idea behind such definition is that networks are forms of capital that we rely on to help solve our collective problems (even though they may benefit their members personally), and that collaborative norms enable collaboration within these networks. Within this definition, I make a similar distinction with Hooghe and Stolle (2003, p.2) between the two components of social capital: (i) civic networks (the *structural components*), which include both formal (e.g., parent-teacher associations, professional organizations, and community based organizations) and informal networks (e.g., family, friends, and neighbors); and (ii) norms, values, and understandings such as trust and reciprocity that facilitate inter-personal collaboration (the *cognitive or attitudinal components*).

While much has been written on both the structural and cognitive components of social capital, the social capital theory is weakest when it comes to explaining how social capital is formed in the first place. Many authors have pointed out this weakness. Bebbington (1999, p. 2039), for instance, observes, “while the mechanisms for building and protecting human, produced and natural capital are clearer, the processes through which social capital is constructed are little understood.” Khrisna (2007, p. 941; 2002, p.

19) and Freitag (2006, p. 123) similarly suggest that social capital theory is deficient in explaining how social capital is and can be created. Svendsen and Svendsen (2004, p. 4) agree, “The question of how social capital is created/destroyed has not yet been answered in the literature.” Ostrom (2000, p. 173) also notes, “We need a much better understanding of how social capital is constituted and transformed over time.” Hooghe and Stolle (2003, p. 2, 5, 7) find it bewildering that whereas there are many studies focusing on the definition, measurement, and consequences of social capital, the sources behind the generation of social capital are largely unexplored in the literature.

This paper gains significance in this context by examining how social capital could form following a disaster. The paper specifically focuses on the formation of civic networks, i.e. the structural components of social capital, and the factors that enable such formation. Such factors include: the cognitive components of social capital, which enable collaboration within these networks; local leaders that help people get organized to undertake collective action and attain resources; and state institutions and policies that may hinder or enable collective action. A brief review of the existing literature on the role of each of these factors in formation of structural components of social capital is provided below.

Cognitive Components of Social Capital

There is much emphasis in the social capital literature on trust and reciprocity (and to a lesser extent on solidarity) as the underlying norms that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit. These norms develop mainly due to repeated face-to-face interaction and transmitted from one generation to the next through informal institutions such as culture, tradition, and religion (Fukuyama 2001; 1995; Svendsen and Svendsen 2004). Whereas these norms are important, we know little about the role of other norms, especially of place attachment, in creation of structural components of social capital. Place attachment refers to an affective bond between people and places (Altman and Low 1992). There is a rather large literature on place attachment in the fields of environmental and community psychology as well as in geography and planning (e.g., see Manzo and Perkins, 2006). However, the concept of place attachment has made little inroads into the social capital literature (Schaefer-McDaniel 2004, p. 163).

Local Leaders

The scant literature on social capital formation indicates the importance of local leaders in terms of facilitating collaboration in communities. In his study of 69 villages in Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh states in India, Khrisna (2002, p. 163) argues, “social capital represents a potential—a propensity for mutually beneficial collective action. Potential needs to be mobilized, however, and directed toward carefully selected ends.” He suggests that it is the village leaders who assisted in mobilizing this latent resource.

These leaders were non-caste-based, young, and educated, and they mediated between the members of their village and the state to attain various political and economic gains for their villages and/or themselves. In a more recent study which tracked the growth of social capital over a period of seven years in 61 villages in Rajasthan, Khrishna (2007) emphasizes the importance of local leadership not only in generation but also in maintenance of social capital.

State Institutions and Policies

There is a growing body of literature on how state institutions and policies can play a role in creation of social capital. This literature is greatly influenced by Douglas North's (1990) work on new institutional economics and Peter Evans's work on state-civil society synergy (1996a; 1996b). It has grown partly in reaction to Putnam's initial work on Italy (Putnam et al. 1993), which suggested that social capital is a relatively stable endowment with deep historical roots and that it is not possible to divert the societies from their pre-determined path if social capital has been historically lacking. In his later works, Putnam acknowledged a role for the state to play in the formation (and destruction) of social capital through public policy (Putnam 1995; Putnam and Feldstein 2003). He stated "the myriad ways in which the state encourages and discourages social-capital formation have been under-researched...Such questions represent some of the many unexplored frontiers in social capital research" (Putnam 2002, p. 17). A number of studies since Putnam's work on Italy (Putnam et al. 1993) have shown how enabling institutions and policies of the state can be beneficial for social capital formation. The institutions and policies mentioned in the literature relate to, for instance, the voluntary sector (Evans 19996a; 1996b; Hall 1999), citizen participation and social inclusiveness (Freitag 2006; Lowndes and Wilson 2001), education (Hall 1999; Schneider et al. 1997), equality (Kumlin and Rothstein 2005; Rothstein 2008; Uslaner 2003), and local autonomy (Freitag 2006). As noted by Uphoff (2000, p. 238), however, "governments are unfortunately still often reluctant to make investments in social capital, even though its benefits can be demonstrated." Besides, Khrishna's longitudinal study on social capital (2007) suggests that direct (e.g., by promoting local organizations) and indirect (e.g., infrastructure investments) external interventions by the government and non-profit organizations are unlikely to contribute to building up social capital in a significant way.

Research Method: Case Study of Gölcük

Edwards and Foley (1998, pp. 135-136) note that "it is important to pay close attention to the circumstances in which forms of capital are created and deployed." They also highlight that the social capital literature "in general would benefit from more theoretically informed case analyses" (1998, p. 136). This research is based on the case

study of social capital formation in the city of Gölcük following the August 17, 1999 earthquake in Turkey. Gölcük is 109 km from Istanbul and had a population of 55,790 in 2000 (State Institute of Statistics 2002, p. 63). It is the center of Gölcük district, which was the epicenter of the August 17, 1999 earthquake in Turkey (7.4 magnitude). This earthquake officially killed some 17,480 people, the highest death toll in the country since the 1939 Erzincan earthquake (Prime Minister's Office-Crisis Management Center, PMO-CMC. 2000). Unofficial estimates, however, put the death toll at 50,000. The earthquake also damaged 30,540 business and 213,843 housing units, the largest number of housing units damaged by any earthquake in Turkey (PMO-CMC 2000). Most of the damage from the earthquake was concentrated in eight provinces. These provinces comprise 6.85 percent of Turkey's total surface area, yet they housed approximately 24 percent of the total population at the time of the earthquake (State Institute of Statistics 2000). The impact of the earthquake on the country's economy was extensive, estimated at around \$20 billion (Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters 2008).

The city of Gölcük was hit particularly hard by the earthquake: 66 percent of its housing units and 72 percent of its business units suffered from some form of damage. Of damaged housing units, 56 percent were completely destroyed or heavily damaged, 29 percent were moderately damaged, and 15 percent were slightly damaged. Of damaged business units, 57 percent were completely destroyed or heavily damaged, 24 percent were moderately damaged, and 19 percent were slightly damaged. The extent of destruction in the city was such that it prompted the members of the Union of Chambers of Turkish Engineers and Architects (UCTEA) to call Gölcük a "dead city" (UCTEA 2000, p. 8). Nonetheless, the city has been rebuilt since then (Ganapati and Ganapati 2009). Although death toll statistics from the earthquake in the city of Gölcük are not available, the death toll was 5,383 in the district of Gölcük, which corresponds to almost one third of the overall death toll from the earthquake (PMO-CMC 2000).

In the aftermath of the earthquake, earthquake victims in Gölcük established several civic networks as a means to achieve particular ends. These ends ranged from having a say in the recovery of Gölcük and helping the most disadvantaged earthquake victims—the poor, the handicapped, and the women—to saving lives of disaster victims elsewhere. The networks were established in different forms: as formal community organizations, informal neighborhood networks, search and rescue teams, women's cooperatives, and informal aid networks. Their member compositions and activities were also diverse. While some were designed exclusively for women, others were mixed. Some organized visits to central government offices in Ankara. Others focused on candle making and sewing, distributing food to those who were hungry, and offering free language and music lessons to the youth.

Whereas some of these networks were *place-based*, which addressed the needs of territorial communities (i.e., the neighborhood, city); others were *issue-based*, which

dealt with a priority issue of concern (e.g., search and rescue in emergencies and economic security of earthquake victims). In this article, I focus on the place-based networks and their post-earthquake formation in Gölcük. These networks include: (a) the formal networks of GADER (*Gölcük 17 August Association*) and MAGDER (*Association for Protection and Development of Kocaeli-Gölcük and Solidarity with the Disadvantaged*); and (b) the informal network of KNN (*Kavaklı Neighborhood Network*). I selected these three networks for the study since their overall focus following the earthquake was on the territorial needs of the city as a whole (GADER and MAGDER) or a particular neighborhood within the city (KNN).

A close examination of these three place-based networks through case study was important to develop a deeper understanding of the relationship between disasters and the process of social capital formation. It especially allowed me to see how structural components of social capital (as embedded in civic networks), the main focus of this paper, are formed due to cognitive components of social capital (as embedded in norms that enable collaboration) and the interplay among different actors: local leaders, international donor agencies, and the state. The complex interactions among the actors especially would not have been easy to capture unless deeply examined within a specific context.

I collected the primary data for the case study through in-depth and semi-structured interviews with earthquake victims (32 individuals) and policy makers (25 individuals). In addition, I interviewed a local historian to better understand how the city has evolved over time and to what extent its history has been shaped by natural disasters. The ages of the interviewees ranged from 18 to 74 years. Their professional and educational attainment levels were varied: from the mayor of Gölcük to the unemployed, and from those who had graduate degrees to those who did not even have a primary school education.

The earthquake victims included in the study were members of the networks' "active core." I used the term "active core" following Disaster Research Center's earlier work on emergent groups, which revealed that such groups typically exhibit three tiers of member participation (Quarantelli 1983): (a) an "active core" who often join the group early and stay involved in group activities for long periods of time (smallest in size); (b) a "supporting circle" that the group can mobilize for specific purposes, such as attending a protest (larger than the active core), and; (c) "nominal supporters" who occasionally participate in group activities (the largest of all three in size). I initially identified the active core of the networks through a review of the daily post-earthquake editions of a local newspaper (*Gölcük Haber*). I then used participant observation and the snowball technique to further build my sample.

The policy makers included in the study were those who were involved in the design and implementation of disaster recovery plans in Gölcük, such as the government

officials at the local, district, and central levels (e.g., policy makers at the Ministry of Public Works and Reconstruction, and the Municipality of Gölcük) and practitioners who worked for international donors (e.g., World Bank officials). I identified the initial policy makers to be included in the study through regular visits to the offices that are typically involved in recovery phase of a disaster in Turkey and by simply asking who was involved in Gölcük's recovery plans. I then relied on the snowball technique to expand my sample.

My objective in undertaking the purposive sampling technique was to closely understand the circumstances in which social capital is created by the members of the networks. Representativeness was subsidiary to this objective and it is difficult to say how representative the samples of earthquake victims and policy makers were of the city's population or the policy makers at the time. Most earthquake victims participating in the study (56%), however, were females, mainly because women comprised a majority of the networks' active cores in Gölcük. In addition, most policy makers participating in the study (68%) were appointed officials, mainly because elected officials were generally more reluctant to be interviewed. This was perhaps not surprising given the fact that elected officials were subject to much criticism after the earthquake due to high death toll, as further explained in Ganapati (2005).

I conducted the interviews in different locations, including the offices of civic networks, homes of earthquake victims, offices of planners and policy makers, and other locations convenient to the interviewees (e.g., coffee shops—*pastane* in Turkish). I concluded the interviews upon reaching “theoretical saturation”, that is when additional interviews did not add anything new to the knowledge gained from previous interviews. The interviews lasted one-half to two and one-half hours. I recorded them with the permission of the participants and transcribed them word-by-word in Turkish. I then coded my data into conceptual categories and patterns using inductive theory construction guidelines.

I supplemented the interviews with participatory site observation and a focus group having seven neighborhood representatives from Gölcük. In addition, I reviewed secondary sources. Such sources included plans prepared for Gölcük's recovery, Turkish national newspapers (e.g., *Milliyet*, *Hürriyet*), a local newspaper in Gölcük (*Gölcük Haber*), laws and regulations (e.g., the Turkish Disaster and Urban Development Laws), minutes of the Turkish Grand National Assembly, and published documents from international (e.g., the World Bank), governmental, non-governmental and private (e.g., planning and consulting firms) agencies.

Place-Based Civic Networks in Gölcük

This section provides a brief introduction to the three place-based civic networks (the structural components of social capital) that were the subjects of my study in Gölcük.

These networks were established following the August 17, 1999 earthquake to focus on the recovery and mitigation needs of the city and its oldest neighborhood: the formal city-wide networks of GADER and MAGDER, and the informal neighborhood-based network of KNN. A more detailed information on these networks is provided in Ganapati (2005).

GADER: This place-based network was established in Gölcük within three months of the earthquake. The mission of the association was described in its by-laws as:

To ensure mutual aid and solidarity among people who suffered damages from the earthquake, to undertake initiatives to meet their needs, to participate in the reconstruction of the entire GÖLCÜK district and to make sure that people of GÖLCÜK have a voice in this [reconstruction] process.

The founders of GADER shared the opinion that they needed to bridge the differences between different interest groups in the city and represent the whole city, so that they can be heard and taken seriously by the state. Accordingly, they actively recruited people from diverse interest groups for the association. For instance, the initial members of the association included the ex-mayors of Gölcük, city council members, local heads of all the political parties in Gölcük, neighborhood heads (*muhtars*), and heads of civic networks that existed prior to the earthquake. The association also accommodated a diverse group of professionals, including local businessmen, retired military officials, contractors, architects, engineers, government officials, teachers, and workers. With approximately 1,000 members, GADER organized various group visits to Ankara to inform decision makers at the central government regarding the recovery and mitigation priorities of Gölcük. In addition, it undertook activities targeted towards the earthquake victims, including educational and training programs for women (e.g., on sewing, embroidery, and batique) and youth (e.g., courses on English and mathematics). The activities of the association were funded through membership fees and donations, as well as through financial and logistic support from the local government of Gölcük.

MAGDER: Earthquake victims' efforts to establish MAGDER started around the same time as GADER. Due to bureaucratic delays, however, the network was formalized eight months after the earthquake. Similar to GADER, MAGDER wanted to have a say in Gölcük's recovery process. It also placed an emphasis on access to information and educating the public. Founders of MAGDER were critical of GADER since they believed that the members of GADER included those who contributed to the high death toll from the earthquake. In their eyes, ex-contractors were the ones who erected flimsy buildings by stealing from the construction materials to reduce their costs. Ex-mayors had a role in high death toll as well, since they allowed the contractors to evade the building codes in a first degree seismic hazard zone like Gölcük. In addition, the founders of MAGDER

believed that GADER did not represent Gölcük as a whole, especially disadvantaged groups such as the poor, disabled, renters, and women. They stated the mission of the association in its bylaws as:

To ensure that people in Gölcük district have access to information so that they can take active part in the decision making processes for reconstruction of Gölcük, to undertake efforts to educate people about past and future natural and social disasters, and to act in solidarity with the disadvantaged and aid one another.

Similar to GADER, MAGDER brought together a diverse group of people, ranging from the political right and the left, the religious and the secular, the rich and the poor, and the literate and the illiterate (approximately 1,000 members). It undertook several activities, including formulating proposals for the reconstruction of Gölcük and for mitigating future damages, organizing seminars on disasters to educate the public, providing individual legal counseling to the disadvantaged for court cases, and addressing the housing problems of disaster victims who were renters prior to the earthquake. It also offered training courses for women (e.g., on painting, and batique) and youth (e.g., music), provided scholarships for educating children who lost their parents in the earthquake, and offered computer courses to the quake victims who were looking for jobs. The activities of GADER were initially supported by an international donor but were then funded through membership dues, donations, fund raising activities, and logistic support from the local government of İhsaniye, another city in Gölcük district.

KNN: This was an informal place-based network of the residents of Kavaklı, the oldest neighborhood in the city of Gölcük. Kavaklı neighborhood was greatly impacted by the August 17, 1999 earthquake. Much of the land there subsided (nearly 2-3 meters) due to the earthquake, changing the morphology of the neighborhood. Indeed, some of the land in Kavaklı disappeared under the water, taking many buildings and their occupants along with it. Due to the characteristics of the ground (e.g., low weight bearing capacity), the central government informed the neighborhood residents that some buildings in Kavaklı (76 out of 207) were unsafe and had to be vacated. This government request came almost two years after the earthquake and brought together neighborhood residents within KNN. Since the residents were convinced that the state had arbitrarily chosen the buildings that needed to be vacated, they resisted vacating their homes. As one KNN member explained:

Do you know how [they came up with] 76 houses? You take one house, leave the other. You take one house, leave the other...You take my next door neighbor, you leave me. There can not be such a thing. If there is

danger [for me], then danger will be there for my neighbor as well...I wanted an explanation for this. Why certain places? 76 houses. Why not 207? Why 76?

There were other reasons for the resistance of Kavaklı residents as well. An important factor was that these residents already had strong bonds with one another prior to the earthquake and refused to be separated from their neighbors. As one resident explained, residents of Kavaklı never asked one another, “We are coming for tea, are you home? Are you available? Never! Never!” They just showed up at the door of their neighbors. Besides, most of residents had inherited their houses from their ancestors. The name of the neighborhood was even mentioned in Ottoman land surveys (*tahrir*) prior to the 17th century (GADER 2000, p. 53). A founding member of the KNN explained the emotional value that the houses hold for them as follows:

This house was registered in 1939 when the municipality was established. The history of the house is very old. I renovate my house like putting make up on an old lady. What lie in here are not our material things but spiritual things...All of these [the houses in the neighborhood] were inherited from our grandfathers. We have spiritual things here...Three to five generations grew up together here...Our roots are all here.

KNN actively voiced the concerns of Kavaklı residents to various state authorities, such as the Parliament and the ministries since the August 17, 1999 earthquake. It is important to note that establishment of GADER and MAGDER was quite unique in Gölcük since pre-earthquake Gölcük did not have a single *local* formal place-based network that focused on the needs of the city as a whole. It is difficult to document the pre-earthquake levels of formal civic engagement in Gölcük in numbers (and even harder to document the levels of informal civic engagement) or compare with other cities in Turkey since no such data is publicly available at the city or even at the district level in Turkey. Indeed, until recently, such data was not made public by the Department of Associations, Ministry of the Interior; even at the provincial level (present data is available through the ministry’s website). In my fieldwork, however, I found out that Gölcük had two types of formal networks before the earthquake: (a) branches of national voluntary associations such as the Tradesmen’s Guild, Association of Atatürk’s Thought, Association of Muhtars (neighborhood heads), Association of Retired Workers, Association of Humanitarians, Turkish Harb-İs Worker’s Union, Lions Club, Rotary Club, and the Turkish Red Crescent Society; and (b) locally based formal networks on education and sports, such as sport clubs, parent-teacher associations, and school associations. In other words, features of formal associations were existent in pre-

earthquake Gölcük. However, none of these associations were place-based, focusing on the needs of Gölcük as a whole or on a particular neighborhood of the city per se.

Despite the fact that Gölcük did not have a formal place-based network prior to the earthquake, its pre-earthquake formal networks was instrumental in the formation of GADER, MAGDER, and KNN after the earthquake. As it will be explained later, local leaders who established these networks were a part of Gölcük's pre-earthquake formal networks and/or political parties. They relied on their pre-earthquake civic and political engagement experience to mobilize the place-based social capital of Gölcük, and, in some cases, to capitalize on donor opportunities to establish the networks (e.g., in case of MAGDER).

The Role of Norms in the Formation of Place-Based Networks

This section explores the role of cognitive components of social capital in formation of place-based networks (structural components of social capital) in Gölcük following the earthquake. It reveals that the earthquake contributed to the formation of cognitive components of social capital, such as redefined bonding of Gölcük's residents to place (their city and neighborhood) and to people (solidarity with their fellow residents). Both these norms were then instrumental in the formation of place-based networks. While the existing literature on social capital places much emphasis on trust and reciprocity (and to a lesser extent on solidarity), it is more or less silent on the importance of place attachment in facilitating collective action.

Re-bonding to Place. Prior to the earthquake, when asked about their origins, residents of Gölcük would mention the city where they originally hailed from. This is because Gölcük is a diverse community where large groups of refugees with different ethnic backgrounds from the Caucasia settled after the long wars between the Ottoman and Russian Empires in the nineteenth century. Besides, the city attracts many others who migrate from smaller towns in Turkey in search of a better life, as noted by one interviewee:

There were no hospitals, nothing there [where I came from]. In winter, it would snow two meters on the ground...You cannot take your kid to the hospital. You need to walk for two to three hours [to reach the hospital]...or build a boat and take him/her...What will the kids do [there]? There is nothing for them to do after graduating from the primary school. They will herd cows. What will happen if they herd cows? They cannot reach anywhere. Since we came here, we gave our kids jobs at least...We thank God.

Following the earthquake, however, Gölcük residents developed a stronger sense of belonging to their city. They started emphasizing that they were from Gölcük. Some labeled this as “local nationalism”:

Today Gölcük is a region which is composed of people who migrated from all regions. Perhaps it is a city which is composed of 30 to 40 percent local people and 60 percent those from outside. I mean if you ask[ed] people here [prior to the earthquake]..., no one will [would] say, “I am from Gölcük,” unless they are from here originally. We felt this [that we are from Gölcük] inside at that time. We started saying that “We are from Gölcük.”... Believe it or not, in the aftermath of the earthquake, localism started. I [now] enjoy more to say that “I am from Gölcük area”... This image settled in us... “Local nationalism” grew stronger after the earthquake. This happened not in me alone but in many people. Everybody started to have the habit of saying “I am from Gölcük.”

There were various emotional reasons for the people of Gölcük to develop a stronger sense of belonging to their city after the earthquake. Many of the survivors had lost their loved ones in the earthquake. They felt obliged to stay in Gölcük in memory of the loved ones; they simply could not leave the “burial grounds” of the loved ones behind. There were also many who went missing after the earthquake. The relatives of missing individuals stayed on in Gölcük, not knowing whether their loved ones were dead or alive, and hoping that they would show up in front of the door one day. In other words, people’s relationship to place was redefined in connection with the burial grounds and memories of the dead and the hope of finding the missing.

Redefined bonding to place (Gölcük) was particularly strong within the first year of the earthquake, and it played a significant role in the formation of GADER and MAGDER. According to one of the founding members of GADER, one of the driving forces behind the organization was the “local nationalism.” It was through this “local nationalism” that they were able to bring different interest groups in the city together under one roof and establish a permanent association for Gölcük. “Local nationalism” was also an important factor in establishment of MAGDER. Indeed, one of the founding members of MAGDER was the person who started the notion of “local nationalism” by putting up the sign “I love Gölcük” on his car three days after the earthquake. Similarly, members of KNN had strong attachments to Gölcük in general and to their neighborhood in specific. As one KNN member said, they had “spiritual ties” to their neighborhood. The homes in Kavaklı were built by their ancestors and had accommodated three to five generations. Their “roots” were there.

Re-bonding to People. As I mentioned earlier, there is a broad agreement in the disaster literature that disaster victims exhibit solidarity with one another in the aftermath of disasters even though solidarity is usually short-lived. Similar norms emerged in Gölcük during the emergency response and rescue period. This was understandable since the people of Gölcük experienced the dramatic event together and saved each other's lives from the rubble. Since the state was incapacitated in the first two or three days of the earthquake, many people were saved by their family members, friends, neighbors, and others whom they did not even know or care about prior to the earthquake.

The sense of brotherhood and sisterhood which developed immediately after the earthquake cut across the classes and ideologies that divided them prior to the earthquake. An interviewee explained this as follows:

It [referring to the earthquake] was an emotional event, of course. That moment people came closer. I mean without caring about the politics, about the political structure. The left-wing, the right-wing, who knows what, all of them were in solidarity with one another. I remember it quite well. People who showed guns to each other before [the earthquake] saved each other from the rubble [after the earthquake]. This was of course a very emotional event.

According to my interviewees, the strong bond between the earthquake victims which emerged in the immediate aftermath of the earthquake deepened in the next three months as they lived in close proximity to one another and had intense face-to-face interaction as part of their daily lives. The earthquake had left everyone homeless by necessity or by choice. Even though some people left Gölcük after the earthquake, most residents stayed in the area. They established their tents and wooden barracks side by side. They did everything together. Those whose houses were fully destroyed or had suffered from heavy damage had no homes to return to. Those whose homes had little or no damage from the earthquake also could not return to their homes due to their fear of experiencing a strong aftershock inside the buildings.

The bond between the homeless earthquake victims was so strong that even after the major after-shocks of the earthquake stopped, some earthquake victims whose homes were habitable initially refused to leave their earthquake "sisters and brothers" in tents and enjoy the comforts of their homes. One earthquake victim explained why she did not move back to her home even after the major after-shocks of the earthquake stopped:

While my friends and relatives sleep in the tent, I cannot sleep inside on my bed. I shared this with them. I shared the hunger, the thirst. I shared their pain... We shared everything. The chain there was beautiful.

Everyone was attached to one another. There was nothing monetary. Everything was moral. It was so beautiful. I had the pleasure of that.

Since many earthquake victims did not have any job to return to, most of the time they did nothing else but exchange intimate and emotional stories with one another. The exchange of stories took place as part of their daily face-to-face interaction. The stories were mostly about the earthquake, and they reflected the fears and hopes of the earthquake victims about the future. Some earthquake victims still have fond memories of those days. One earthquake victim who lived in a tent for almost a year in Gölcük related her experience of those days as follows:

In tents, we used to have tea parties until midnight. [I remember] our friendly chats. People of Kavaklı were all in one place... We would set up a fire around the tents. Until midnight, all we talked about [around the fire] was the earthquake. We did not have any relationship with the [outside] world... Indian [Native American style] chats: triangular tents and a fire in the middle.

The city center was also instrumental for the people of Gölcük to interact with one another and listen to each other's stories. One earthquake victim explained how Gölcük's residents got together in the city center to talk about how they could address the recovery needs of their city:

After we buried our dead, we slowly started to pull ourselves together. Everyone was talking about some things in the *city center* [emphasis added] but could not take them above [to the level of the state]. We said [to ourselves that] combining the forces was a must...50-60 leading members of the community got together in the municipality's assembly hall.

The norms of solidarity began to dissipate after three months of the earthquake. According to one interviewee, this was because some earthquake victims (e.g., those whose homes were not destroyed) eventually went back to their homes to escape the harsh winter (around November 1999) and some moved into prefabricated areas built by the Turkish government or other donors outside of their pre-earthquake neighborhoods. As a resident of Kavaklı neighborhood noted, "When life goes back to normal, again calculations are being made. Things become as they were in the past."

Despite its dissipation over time, the initial norms of solidarity built the foundation for collective action in Gölcük. According to the earthquake victims interviewed, the

initial meetings to establish GADER and MAGDER were held within two to three months of the earthquake, during which solidarity was still strong. As noted earlier, GADER's bylaws explicitly stated solidarity as one of its goals: "to ensure mutual aid and solidarity among people who suffered damages from the earthquake." Similarly, MAGDER mentioned one of its goals as "to act in solidarity with the disadvantaged and aid one another." Besides, the term solidarity was even reflected in MAGDER's name: Association for Protection and Development of Kocaeli-Gölcük and Solidarity with the Disadvantaged. Members of KNN had strong bonds with one another as well, as reflected in their informal day-to-day contacts with one another.

The Role of Local Leaders in Formation of Place-Based Networks

As noted in the social capital literature, local leaders could play important roles in activating social capital in communities (Khrisna 2002). This was true in Gölcük as well. The earthquake had deepened the connection of people of Gölcük with the place and the people. Yet, it was the local leaders who invested time and effort to help mobilize the earthquake victims to establish the place-based networks. These individuals were in a position to achieve such mobilization because of three reasons. First, they were morally motivated to help Gölcük recover. Many of these individuals had devoted their lives to Gölcük, and they felt obliged to do something for the city of Gölcük, its people, and its future generations. A founding member of GADER explained his motivations as follows:

I was born here. I was raised here...I was educated through the taxes of the people in Gölcük—although many of them are not alive today. I feel that I am indebted to them... I look at the sun. I look at the moon. I look at the sea. I look at the river. I look at the trees. I look at the soil. All these are serving me... I mean they serve people; they serve all of us... There is nothing more beautiful than serving human beings.

Second, these local leaders were able to invest time and effort after the earthquake in mobilizing their fellow earthquake victims in Gölcük, partly because they were relatively less impacted by the earthquake. They had stable jobs to which they could return after the initial few weeks following the earthquake as opposed to mostly unemployed earthquake victims; hence, they were in better positions financially. Some also had alternative places of residence where they could stay (e.g., homes of relatives, factory accommodation), as opposed to many earthquake victims who had to stay in tents or prefabricated housing units for several months. According to one interviewee from GADER, these individuals were "still standing" after the earthquake, and therefore they were able to take the lead in establishing the networks:

Things that were experienced after the earthquake had impacted people to a great extent. Everybody was waiting for some liberation from somewhere. Instead of waiting like that, people who were still standing felt the need to have a different structure here.

Third, local leaders who established the place-based networks had prior civic and/or political experience. They were involved in civic networks (e.g., sports clubs, civil defense organizations, labor unions) and/or political organizations (e.g., political parties) in Turkey *prior to* the August 17, 1999 earthquake. Their pre-earthquake civic engagement did not include participation in the activities of any formal place-based network in Gölcük, partly because Gölcük had no such network before the earthquake. As explained earlier, it only had branches of national voluntary organizations and locally based education or sports organizations. However, due to their pre-earthquake experience, these individuals were already familiar with the procedures and practices of civic life, which helped them in their efforts to establish the networks.

Such pre-earthquake experience of local leaders also helped them in finding financial or logistic support from potential donors for their networks. For instance, one of MAGDER's founders was able to find initial donor support from Dutch Interchurch Aid (ACT) and its intermediary Turkish Agency called the World Academy for Local Government and Democracy (WALD) for the network due to his pre-earthquake civic connections. ACT is a global alliance of churches and relief agencies assisting people to recover from emergencies; and WALD is a foundation which aims to promote democracy at the local level around the world. These agencies supported a two-year long project called "Institution Building and Capacity Development through Support for Civic Associations of Earthquake Victims" in the earthquake zone after August 17, 1999. This project aimed at building the capacity of MAGDER and seven other associations of earthquake victims (called DEPDERs in short) that were established in the aftermath of the earthquake to articulate the demands of victims and to ensure their participation in the disaster recovery processes. One of the advantages of this project was that it promoted the nesting of small associations of earthquake victims within a larger network. Putnam and Feldstein (2003, p. 278) call these networks a "federation" while discussing social capital, and Drabek and his colleagues call them emergent multi-organizational networks (EMONs) when referring to networks that emerge in response to disasters (Drabek 2003; 1985; Drabek et al. 1981). As part of ACT and WALD's project, DEPDERs had an assembly that met twice a month to voice the problems of the disaster stricken region and share their experiences. A member of MAGDER talked about the benefits of this assembly in terms of transferring lessons from one place to another in the earthquake zone as follows:

The permanent housing was completed and its lottery was conducted here [in Gölcük] first. We prepared reports on all the irregularities and distributed them to all the DEPDERS. They had a chance to conduct activities [to deal with these irregularities] a week before the lottery was conducted. Our partnerships had these kinds of benefits. DEPDER assembly was very meaningful indeed.

It is important to note two aspects of ACT and WALD. These organizations did not seek to establish MAGDER per se (unlike the local leaders). Founding members of MAGDER already had plans to establish a network and they were looking for funding sources. Due to their pre-earthquake civic links, they were able to seize funding opportunities in the post-earthquake context. Second, these organizations were part of a larger donor network that undertook capacity building activities in the earthquake zone and earthquake prone areas (i.e., Istanbul) in Turkey after August 17, 1999. For instance, the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation sponsored training of disaster committees (to assess the vulnerability of neighborhoods) and search and rescue groups in several neighborhoods after the earthquake. Through a Turkish Intermediary Agency (Women's Solidarity Foundation, *Kadınlarla Dayanışma Vakfı* in Turkish), Humanitarian Agency of the United Methodist Church (UMCOR) trained women earthquake victims, most of whom had lost their household breadwinners, on different trades (e.g., sewing, making candles) so that they could stand on their own economically during recovery period and beyond. Such donor involvement in the aftermath of the earthquake was partly in response to the government's inaction in the earthquake zone to meet the wide-ranging needs of earthquake victims and was partly motivated by what was called the post-earthquake "awakening" of the Turkish civil society, both of which are explained below.

The Role of State in Formation of Place-Based Networks

Social capital literature suggests that enabling institutions and policies of the state can benefit social capital formation (Hall 1999; Lowndes and Wilson 2001; Rothstein 2008). Place-based networks in Gölcük, however, formed not because of an enabling state but despite the institutions and policies of the Turkish government that were not particularly conducive to collective action. GADER, MAGDER, and KNN were in many ways reactions to the top-down recovery institutions and anti-Islamic policies of state actors at the national level. State actors at the local level (e.g., municipalities), however, enabled these networks by providing them with logistic support. At the same time, they favored some networks over others due to ideological preferences.

Against the Top-Down Institutions of the State. Place-based networks in Gölcük reflected the people of Gölcük's desire to have a say in disaster recovery process in the

face of state's top-down institutions. The Ministry of Public Works and Settlement (MPWS) legally has sole control over disaster recovery process in Turkey (Ganapati 2008). Although local and provincial governments in Turkey are mandated to prepare local level settlement plans within their jurisdictions under normal circumstances, Article 8 of the Development Law—No. 3194 (İmar Kanunu) allows the Ministry to intervene in the preparation and revision of plans that relate to disasters affecting the life of general public. In the aftermath of the August 17, 1999 earthquake, the Ministry invoked the authority granted by this article. It announced within six days of the earthquake that it would prepare local-level plans as well as the plans for permanent housing areas in the earthquake zone. This meant that local government officials and earthquake victims, who were nearest to the disaster location and who knew the local conditions the best, were divorced from the planning processes. As a local government official noted, all they could do was share the plans they had saved from their destroyed archives and give site tours to the officials from the Ministry. Their opinions were not solicited from above.

Top down institutions provided advantages initially with respect to disaster recovery, especially in terms of acting in a timely manner and proceeding fast in the aftermath of the earthquake. The Ministry officials, for instance, arrived in the quake zone once accessibility to the area was restored. They identified the location of temporary housing areas as early as August 22, 1999, six days after the earthquake (Bozkurt 2001). During these times, local government officials in Gölcük were in no position to assume their official duties, as noted by an official from the Ministry:

[When we arrived in Gölcük] there were no local governments. They were bankrupt. No one was with you with the identity of a local government official. There were no technical personnel. Everybody [including local government officials] was a quake victim.

Despite its advantages, the feelings against the state's top-down approach to recovery were strong among the earthquake victims in Gölcük. This was because the image of the Turkish state had shattered after the earthquake due to its lack of preparedness for and inefficient response to the earthquake. The Turkish state has traditionally been strong (Heper 1985) and has been considered as a paternal figure that should “provide for, look after, and protect” Turkish citizens (Dodd 1979: 70). The roots of this tradition date back to the Ottoman Empire, during which the Sultan was held responsible personally for the welfare of the ruled and the ruled were obliged to show full respect and obedience to their “Father”, the Sultan (Mardin 1969). With the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923, the Turkish state replaced the sultan as a paternal figure, as expressed in such folk expressions as *Devlet Baba* (Father State) and *memleket çocukları* (children of the nation).

On August 17, 1999, people affected by the earthquake waited for their strong Father State to come to their rescue. The Father State and its organs, however, were missing from the scene in the initial days of the earthquake. There was no sign of a well-equipped and trained government team conducting search and rescue operations (*Economist* 1999). Indeed, the government's search and rescue teams as well as the Red Crescent Society (Turkish counterpart of Red Cross) reportedly reached the earthquake zone after some foreign teams and the Red Cross (Milliyet 1999d). According to a Turkish newspaper (Milliyet 1999b), tens of thousands of people in the earthquake zone were shaken for the second time since they were abandoned by the state in the aftermath of the quake. To the surprise of many, however, the historically weak Turkish civil society was actively conducting search and rescue operations and distributing aid to the victims (Ganapati 2005; Jalali 2002; Kubicek 2002; 2001), leading to speculation about its "awakening" (Milliyet 1999e). Such volunteer involvement was similar to the volunteer effort following the Kobe earthquake in Japan, which traditionally had not previously seen such large scale volunteerism (Tierney and Goltz 1997).

There were also many additional reasons that contributed to the shattering of the Father State image after the earthquake [see Jalali (2002) on how the state re-gained some of its credibility following the November 1999 Düzce earthquake]. When the earthquake hit, the state's earthquake fund, one of the three major disaster funds in Turkey at the time, had the equivalent of \$2 (Milliyet 1999a). Prior to the earthquake, the government failed to enforce the existing building codes in earthquake-prone areas, allowing contractors to indirectly pilfer construction materials, particularly reinforcement bars, and erect flimsy buildings, which became tombs for thousands in the earthquake. Furthermore, the state officials decided to scale back the search and rescue operations within five days of the earthquake (Washington Post 1999). Although they did not formally declare that the search and rescue phase was over, they sent heavy equipment to bulldoze the ruins of collapsed buildings due to fears of an outbreak of disease from the decomposing corpses buried underneath the rubble. This move was called "the bitterest order" by one of the Turkish newspapers (Milliyet 1999c). Many bodies, dead or alive, were bulldozed away with the wreckage. In Gölcük, the wreckage was discarded by the MPWS, the ministry in charge of disaster recovery in Turkey, into nearby areas without separating the cement, iron, furniture, or the human bodies. One could see the "pieces of arms and legs" in the wreckage (UCTEA 2000, p. 12). According to my interviewees, the Ministry's mistakes in debris removal and placement were followed by the questionable damage assessment activities undertaken by its unqualified personnel, who assessed damage in housing stock simply by walking the streets rather than by conducting scientific tests in Gölcük.

In addition to these mistakes, the MPWS was generally reluctant to provide information to earthquake victims about its disaster recovery activities on a timely and

transparent manner. I was told by one of my interviewees in the Ministry that they were instructed not to share any information with anyone in the immediate aftermath of the earthquake. Another interviewee from the Ministry noted that even they could not get information from other units within the Ministry. Accordingly, the earthquake victims received most of their information from the mass media but there was great confusion among the victims after the earthquake, especially with respect to their rights.

In sum, the people of Gölcük were fed up with the mistakes of the government in the aftermath of the earthquake and its reluctance to share information. They no longer wanted to play the role of subjects that are obedient to the authority of the state. They wanted the state to have a more informative and participatory approach to disaster recovery. Their desires were reflected in the bylaws of both GADER (i.e., “to participate in the reconstruction of the entire GÖLCÜK district and to make sure that people of GÖLCÜK have a voice in this [reconstruction] process”) and MAGDER (i.e., “to ensure that people in Gölcük district have access to information so that they can take active part in the decision making processes for reconstruction of Gölcük”) mentioned earlier. Although KNN members did not have bylaws per se, they shared the same sentiments as GADER and MAGDER with respect to participation and access to information. They demanded answers from the state regarding its arbitrary relocation policies in the oldest neighborhood in Gölcük. It is important to note, however, that the people of Gölcük did not want to be in direct charge of their recovery. To them, it was still the Father State’s responsibility to fix things in Gölcük, albeit with people’s participation in decision making processes. In the words of one interviewee, the government had to take more “ownership” of Gölcük.

In Reaction to Anti-Islamic Policies of the State. Place-based networks, especially GADER, formed partly in response to the state’s national level policies targeting pro-Islamic groups. Even though a majority of Turks are Muslims, one of the guiding principles of Atatürk, the founder of Turkey, is “secularism.” At the time of the earthquake, the central government was controlled by secular forces (the coalition government at the time, the Turkish Army, and the judicial branch) that were in open conflict with the pro-Islamic party of Gölcük’s mayor, İsmail Barış. The conflicts between the secular and pro-Islamic forces prior to and after the earthquake are elaborated below.

The battle between the secular and pro-Islamic groups was nothing new in Turkey. It had been a part of politics since the establishment of the Turkish Republic in the 1920s. The battle, however, gained momentum following the electoral victory of a pro-Islamic party (Welfare Party) in 1995 national elections and a consequent increase in Islamic-based civil society organizations and schools in the country. Due to these developments, the Turkish Army, which has traditionally seen itself as the guarantor of Atatürk’s

principles, issued an ultimatum to the Welfare Party on February 28, 1997 (referred to as the “February 28 Process” or the “postmodern coup”). This ultimatum mandated measures to be undertaken by the Party against increasing religious fundamentalism in the country. Following the ultimatum, the head of the Welfare Party resigned, leaving his Prime Minister seat to a secular party. Soon after, the Turkish Constitutional Court closed down the Welfare Party.

Most members of the Welfare Party, including the mayor of Gölcük, returned to politics under a new party called the Virtue Party (VP). The VP and the secular forces in the country continued to clash with each other. The Turkish Constitutional Court initiated a new investigation against the Party immediately after it formed, and the Ministry of Home Affairs removed some VP mayors from their posts (New York Times 1998). The biggest confrontation between the two groups took place due to a VP member called Merve Kavakçı, a 31 year old woman who was elected to the Parliament from the Virtue Party in 1999. Kavakçı wore an Islamic head scarf, which she refused to remove under the roof of the Parliament while taking oath (New York Times 1999a). Although some in Turkey see the head scarf as a human rights issue, others consider it backward and a threat to Atatürk’s secular state. Wearing the head scarf in such places as public schools, courts, and government offices was officially banned in the 1980s but there was no strict enforcement of the ban until after the removal of Welfare Party from power. Immediately after Kavakçı incident, a state prosecutor stated that he would seek to ban the Virtue Party on the ground that it was “a vampire sucking the blood of the secular state” (New York Times 1999b). The VP was then marginalized and closely monitored by the authorities [See Ganapati (2005) for a more detailed discussion on the conflicts between secular and pro-Islamic groups in Turkey].

All of these developments had taken place prior to the August 17, 1999 earthquake. The tension between the secular and pro-Islamic religious groups, however, continued to grow in the aftermath of the earthquake. The VP, the party of the mayor of Gölcük, was already strong in four of the eight provinces affected by the August 17, 1999 earthquake, especially in the worst hit provinces of Kocaeli (where Gölcük is located) and Sakarya. In addition, pro-Islamic groups had been very active in the earthquake zone. Since the Turkish state was incapacitated, these groups were undertaking relatively quick and efficient disaster relief operations along with other civil society groups in the region.

Within ten days of the earthquake, the government started a raid against Islamic groups to prevent them from joining the earthquake relief effort. It first froze the bank accounts of two Islamic disaster relief agencies and asked them to drop their donation campaigns for the earthquake. Pro-Islamic groups also attacked the state. A columnist from *Akit* newspaper maintained, “The earthquake was too mild a punishment for Turkey, considering what the Government has done to curb the power of religion in politics” (New York Times 1999c). Mehmet Kutlular, publisher of another pro-Islamic paper

called *Yeni Asya*, also stated that the disaster was a God-sent punishment for the army's attack on Muslims and the ban on use of head scarves in schools (New York Times 2000).

The tension between the secular state and the pro-Islamic groups increased as the time progressed. Within 40 days of the earthquake, all activities of pro-Islamic organizations were banned in the earthquake zone, based on the grounds that they were undertaking propaganda against the Turkish armed forces (Milliyet 1999f). Many of these organizations had established soup kitchens and aid distribution centers in Gölcük as well as in Sakarya and Derince (Kocaeli), all of which had mayors from the VP. Banning the activities of these pro-Islamic organizations in the earthquake zone was followed by police investigations of their members (Milliyet 1999f).

The state's national policies against the Islamic groups were important for formation of place-based networks in Gölcük. This was because Gölcük's recovery process was controlled by the secular central government in Ankara while its mayor, İsmail Barış, was from the marginalized VP. Accordingly, the people of Gölcük suspected that the secular central government would not favor their city while distributing the disaster aid despite the city's immense needs for recovery. Several interviewees noted their belief that the central government would have provided Gölcük with "more aid" if its mayor was from the secular party in power.

Due to such concerns, GADER was presented to the central government in Ankara as an "apolitical" umbrella organization that brought together local heads of all political parties in Gölcük. Even though the mayor of Gölcük was one of GADER's founding members, he was neither listed as one of the founding members nor was he included in its governing board. This was a carefully designed strategy developed by the founding members of GADER, including the mayor himself, to convince the central government that the mayor and his pro-Islamic party were not aligned with GADER.

Suspicious of the people of Gölcük of not being politically favored by the secular central government were not unfounded. In less than two months after the earthquake, Turkish media revealed how the secular coalition government's decisions on disaster recovery were politically motivated, favoring the municipalities governed by their own parties and leaving out, or being much less favorable to, municipalities governed by the Virtue Party (Milli Gazete 1999). Such political favoritism even angered some members of the Turkish Parliament. Ramazan Gül, a representative from Isparta province, noted (Parliament of Turkey 2000):

I am asking the government now, from here: How will you go to the earthquake zone after making these decisions? How will you look at the face of the earthquake victims? What kind of justice is associated with partisanship by using the earthquake as an excuse?! How could you spend

the resources allocated to the earthquake victims for your political future with a partisan approach?

Favoritism of Local Level State Actors. As opposed to the state actors at the national level, state actors at the local level played an enabling role in formation of place-based networks, although they were partial to some networks. Both GADER and MAGDER, for instance, received logistical and/or political support from the local governments in Gölcük district. As mentioned earlier, the mayor of Gölcük was a founding member of GADER even though his name was excluded from the network's formal list of founders or governing board for political reasons. Besides, he provided the network with office space free-of-charge. Even after GADER's establishment, the mayor continued to have a close working relationship with the network, joining them in their internal meetings, official visits, and even paying for their trips to Ankara to lobby the decision makers at the central level.

MAGDER, on the other hand, received political support from other municipalities in Gölcük district (i.e., İhsaniye Municipality). The mayor of Gölcük was opposed to establishment of MAGDER from the beginning. One of the founding members of MAGDER explains the mayor's reaction to their network in a meeting as follows:

When we were establishing [MAGDER], the mayor was opposed to our association. I was in his office. He said that there was no need for another association [since GADER was established by then]... I asked him specifically, "Wouldn't it be better if we have two or three associations? If we have three or four, they would assist all different groups. It would be more beneficial." He had a different thinking, I guess. [His thinking was that] let there be one association and let it be under my wings so that I can shape it to my liking [referring to GADER].

MAGDER received such reaction from Gölcük's mayor partly because most of its founding members were democrats, leading to speculations that it was a left-wing association. In reality, however, MAGDER was an inclusive network. A MAGDER member explains their inclusiveness:

In an association, there are people with different kinds of views. Since we are people with some socialist tendencies, they said that MAGDER was established by leftists. They viewed the other association [GADER] as right-wing people and MAGDER as left-wing. Can there be such a thing? Can there be such a logic? ... What if leftists established it? Leftists established this association for the disadvantaged, for the benefit of the

earthquake victims... We did not differentiate between the people who came here as right-wing or left-wing. All kinds of people, people from all parties came [to our association]... We gave scholarships to our children [to the children of Gölcük] and we did not refuse scholarship to the children of the right-wing people. No such discrimination took place.

In addition to the mayor, MAGDER faced difficulties from the provincial government of Kocaeli, an arm of the Turkish central government during its formation. The governor's office initially refused to approve MAGDER members' request to establish an association on the grounds that there was already an association in Gölcük representing the earthquake victims. MAGDER members then changed their by-laws, especially the section on the mission of the association and their initial proposed name (Gölcük Association of Earthquake Victims). They received the approval the second time around.

Conclusion: Implications for Planners and Policy Makers

The case study of Gölcük points out a close link between disasters and social capital formation, suggesting that disasters could indeed trigger social capital formation as embedded in networks in communities by reshaping the connection of disaster victims with their city and neighborhood (redefined bonding/attachment to place) as well as with their fellow residents (solidarity). In this paper, I characterized both redefined bonding to place and solidarity as cognitive components of social capital, since these norms facilitated collective action among disaster victims in the form of place-based networks of GADER, MAGDER, and KNN in Gölcük. Whereas the focus of this paper was on the structural components of social capital, it was important to understand the role of such cognitive components of social capital in formation of the networks.

Social capital literature currently places much emphasis on trust and reciprocity as the underlying norms which facilitate collective action. Yet, it is curiously silent on place-specific norms such as place attachment (Schaefer-McDaniel 2004, p. 163) that could make collective action possible. As shown in Gölcük, place attachment could enable collective action in neighborhoods and cities affected by disasters. This finding is consistent with Oliver-Smith's (1992) seminal research on Yungay, Peru, following a devastating earthquake and avalanche in 1970. Even though Oliver-Smith did not theorize place attachment per se, his study reveals strong ties to place among disaster victims, as evidenced by their collective refusal to live anywhere else but at the original site of their city against the advice of experts. Findings of Gölcük case study also confirm more recent studies conducted after September 11, 2001 incident (Low 2002) and Hurricane Katrina (Burley et al. 2007; Miller and Rivera 2008) on place attachment among disaster victims.

The study's findings on solidarity adds to the earlier literature on post-disaster cohesive behavior (e.g., Bardo 1978; Barton 1969; Fritz and Marks 1954; Parr 1970) by suggesting that collaborative norms that emerge during the search and rescue period of disasters may extend beyond this period. In Gölcük, solidarity among the earthquake victims emerged during the search and rescue period but deepened during the recovery period due to ongoing face-to-face interaction among the earthquake victims, validating studies on social capital which underline the significance of face-to-face interaction in formation of collaborative norms (Fukuyama 2001; 1995; Svendsen and Svendsen 2004). Face-to-face interaction took place as part of earthquake victims' daily lives mainly in their gathering places in the neighborhoods (e.g., camp fires in Kavaklı) and in the city center. Even though solidarity among the earthquake victims started to dissipate approximately after three months, it paved the way for establishment of place-based networks in Gölcük, as reflected in the bylaws and names of place-based organizations.

In addition to its abovementioned contributions, the case of Gölcük emphasizes the role of local leaders in social capital formation after disasters. This is an extension of Khrishna's (2002) findings to post-disaster contexts. In Gölcük, local leaders felt a moral obligation to help Gölcük and were able to invest time and effort after the earthquake in establishing the networks (as they were "still standing"). They relied on their pre-earthquake civic and/or political experience to mobilize the potential among the earthquake victims for collective action and find donors to support the activities of their networks. These findings also support the findings in the disaster literature that the strength of pre-disaster networks may explain different response and recovery capacities of communities (e.g., Berke, Kartez and Wenger 1993) and that having volunteer time and commitment are essential for mobilization of emergent groups rather than having monetary sources (Stallings and Quarantelli 1985; Quarantelli 1983).

Last, the case of Gölcük both reiterates some findings in the social capital literature on the role of state in social capital formation and challenges others. On one hand, it corroborates that state actors could facilitate social capital formation through their enabling institutions and policies (Evans 1996a; 1996b; Freitag 2006; Hooghe and Stolle 2003; Rothstein 2008). In Gölcük, this was evidenced by the logistic and political support provided by the local governments in the district to place-based networks (despite the fact that some networks were favored over others). On the other hand, the case of Gölcük suggests that social capital forms during disaster recovery in communities affected by disasters not always due to state's enabling formal institutions and policies but sometimes despite (and as a reaction to) its top-down and discriminatory practices at the national level. The study's findings on the role of state provide support for disaster scholars who advocate a decentralized and flexible disaster management system (e.g., Dynes 1994; Neal and Philips 1995) since such a system could play a more enabling role for civic networks at the local level.

This study indicates several directions for future research on social capital and disasters. First, further research is required to understand the benefits and downside of social capital in terms of preparing for, responding to, and recovering from disasters at the individual, household, and community levels. Even though studies on this topic are on the rise (e.g., Aldrich and Crook 2008; Buckland and Rahman 1999; Nakagawa and Shaw 2004; Wisner 2003), we still know little about the impact of social capital on different phases of disasters (e.g., impact of social capital on resiliency of communities during disaster recovery period).

Second, as noted by Ostrom (2000, p. 173), there is a need for more studies on how social capital forms and transforms over time, such as Khrishna's study that examined change in social capital over a period of seven years in rural India (2007). Similar studies were conducted by disaster scholars who studied the emergence, formalization, and transformation of emergent groups after disasters (e.g., Gillespie, Mileti and Perry 1976; Perry, Gillespie and Mileti 1974). This paper did not focus on how social capital, which formed after the earthquake, transformed during disaster recovery period and beyond (e.g., due to inner group conflicts, failures or successes of these networks). Yet, this is an important area of research that may shed light on how to ensure the longer-term sustainability of social capital that forms after disasters.

Third, there is a need for comparative studies on social capital formation in post-disaster contexts. This study examined social capital formation in Gölcük alone. Comparative studies are important since they may be instrumental in identifying common factors that may contribute to social capital formation in post-disaster contexts. In general, as noted by Tierney et al. (2001, p. 147), comparative studies that focus on responses of different communities to the same disaster event are hard to find in the disaster structure. Some exceptions include comparative studies conducted by Bolin and Stanford (1998), Burley et al. (2007) and Stallings and Schepart (1987).

Fourth, we need studies that examine to what extent planners and policy makers include or exclude place-based civic networks that form after disasters, such as GADER, MAGDER, and KNN. As noted by Berke and Campanella (2006, p. 193), there is a great need to give a voice to disaster victims in determining the future of their communities. As this article has shown, the so-called "disaster victims" are active, resilient agents of change who have the capability for collective action. Yet, we know very little about their inclusion in post-disaster planning processes (Ganapati and Ganapati 2009).

Although the main purpose of conducting a case study is not to generalize its findings to other contexts, Gölcük case study provides broader lessons for policy makers, planners, and other practitioners to activate latent social capital in disaster-stricken communities. These lessons include:

1. Use urban design creatively: Decision makers could reinforce the cognitive elements of emergent social capital through urban design. Designing public places (e.g.,

plazas, parks), for example, allow disaster victims to have face-to-face interaction, which could then contribute to enhanced solidarity among them. In Putnam and Feldstein's terms (2003, p. 291), public places are "common spaces for commonplace encounters." Besides, as discussed in Vale and Campanella (2005), urban design (and architecture) is central to the psychological recovery of the community.

2. Ensure proximity among disaster victims: Decision makers could ensure that disaster victims remain close to one another in their own communities following disasters, rather than being dispersed to other communities (as in the case of Hurricane Katrina survivors). Staying in one's own communities and close to one's fellow residents would not only honor disaster victims' redefined bonding to place but also would allow them to have ongoing face-to-face interaction with one another, thereby helping social capital formation and/or expansion in their communities.

3. Undertake capacity building projects: Decision makers could contribute to formation of place-based local civic networks in disaster stricken areas through capacity building projects, as in the case of MAGDER. Such projects could have some leadership components customized toward individuals who were not actively involved in political and/or civic life at the local level before the disaster. It could also offer civic engagement and community development training to disaster victims, introducing them to community development and planning tools (e.g., community visioning, asset mapping, and conflict resolution) to enable their participation in decision making processes.

4. Promote supra-local institutional arrangements: Decision makers could promote such arrangements as federations of networks or EMONs. These federations could include both emergent groups and groups that existed prior to disasters in disaster stricken communities and beyond, to allow for information sharing and for transfer of lessons from one place to the other (e.g., as in the case of DEPDERs). The importance of such arrangements has been acknowledged by the international agencies, albeit in the context of poverty alleviation (Asian Development Bank 2001), as well as by disaster scholars (Drabek 2003; 1985; Drabek et al. 1981; Tierney and Trainor 2004).

5. Encourage partnerships between disaster-stricken and disaster-prone communities: Even though the focus of this paper was on disaster stricken communities, decision makers could encourage partnerships between civic networks that form in disaster stricken communities and civic networks in disaster prone areas to enhance disasters preparedness of disaster prone areas. Such partnerships could create platforms for members of the civic networks in disaster-hit communities and disaster-prone communities to share their experiences and help one another.

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